Ahmed al-Sharaa at the UN: A Path from al-Qaeda to Head of Syria and Its Implications for Human Rights and International Security by Azad Deewanee

Originally published: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2025/10/03/ahmed-al-sharaa-at-the-un-a-path-from-al-qaeda-to-head-of-syria-and-its-implications-for-human-rights-and-international-security/

New Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Speech at the United Nations, 2025. Source: France24.

In December 2024, Syria witnessed a historic reversal. After more than a decade of war, Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship collapsed. But instead of opening a path to pluralism or democracy, Damascus fell to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), once dismissed as just another Jihadist faction. By January 2025, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa had consolidated power, appointing himself Syria’s transitional president.

On 24 September 2025, al-Sharaa stepped onto the global stage, addressing the United Nations in New York. His speech was more than symbolic: it marked the entry of a former al-Qaeda and ISIL-linked commander into formal diplomacy, ironically in the very city that suffered the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks.

For Syrians, this transition has not meant liberation but the entrenchment of a radical Islamist regime. For the international community, al-Sharaa’s appearance at the UN raises urgent questions: Should world leaders recognise and engage a man once deeply tied to al-Qaeda? Or does granting him a platform risk legitimising Islamist authoritarianism at the heart of the Middle East?

Who is Ahmed al-Sharaa?

Al-Sharaa’s trajectory mirrors the broader story of global Jihad. Under his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani, he trained under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, fought U.S. forces, and rose through the Islamic State under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In 2012, he crossed into Syria and founded Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, notorious for suicide bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations.

By 2017, he rebranded the group as HTS, distancing himself rhetorically from al-Qaeda. Designated as a terrorist by the U.N. Security Council since 2013, al-Sharaa resurfaced in late 2024 in a suit and tie, shedding his nom de guerre and presenting himself as a statesman. Behind the wardrobe change, the ideology remained unchanged.

HTS in Power: From Idlib to Damascus

HTS’s years ruling Idlib were a trial run. There, the group enforced Sharia law, imprisoned dissidents, restricted women, displaced Christians, Shia, and Druze, and indoctrinated schools. Those patterns now extend to Damascus:

• Loyalists occupy key ministries and security agencies.
• A ‘transitional’ constitution enshrines Islamic jurisprudence as the supreme source of law.
• Education and military structures are rebuilt around religious indoctrination.
• The elections committee is appointed entirely by al-Sharaa.

What was advertised as  a ‘five-year transition‘ quickly revealed itself as the consolidation of  authoritarianism.

Life Under the Regime: Minorities and Women

Syria’s social fabric is diverse. Sunni Arabs form the majority, but Kurds, Alawites, Druze, and Christians are significant communities. Under al-Sharaa, this mosaic faces existential threats, with many targeted because Salafi rhetoric labels them as apostates, atheists or unbelievers:

• Kurds face forced displacement that amounts to ethnic cleansing, particularly in Afrin, northern Aleppo, and Serekaniye, with calls for self-administration ignored.
• Alawites, associated with Assad, endure massacres, kidnappings, and deaths in detention.
• Druze, especially in al-Suwayda, suffer widespread killings and displacement.
• Christians face systemic discrimination, intimidation, and attacks on churches and religious leaders.
• Women are subject to strict codes governing dress, education, and mobility, with women from minority ethnic and religious groups particularly vulnerable to abduction, harassment, and sexual violence.

Human rights organisations report that these abuses are systemic, aimed at reshaping Syria into a homogenised Sunni Islamist state.

The Diplomatic Game: A Moderate Mask Abroad

At home, al-Sharaa enforces strict ideological conformity. Abroad, he projects pragmatism, pursuing three key objectives:

1. Removal of HTS from international terrorism watchlists.
2. Formal diplomatic recognition.
3. Access to aid and foreign investment.

Turkey and Qatar quickly recognised his regime, while Western governments signalled cautious, conditional engagement. By mid-2025, some sanctions had already begun to ease.

This pattern echoes post-1979 Iran, when Ayatollah Khomeini pledged respect for the rule of law at home and peace abroad while sidestepping commitments to democracy. Once entrenched, the Islamic Republic imposed sweeping repression, particularly against women and minorities, and emerged as a destabilising regional force, exporting Islamist radicalism and pursuing nuclear weapons. Likewise, al-Sharaa’s Salafi ideology denounces the notion of democracy, viewing it as antithetical to Sharia law. His UN address tests whether the international community will once again mistake tactical moderation for genuine political transformation.

Why the World Should Care: Security Beyond Syria

Syria’s internal politics matter globally because the risks extend far beyond its borders:

1. Regional Spread of Radical Islam: Institutionalised Salafism strengthens transnational networks, leaving Sunni populations in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and beyond vulnerable to radicalisation.
2. Mediterranean Security: HTS’s control of Syria’s coastline provides direct maritime access. Combined withTurkey’s regional ambitions and alignment with HTS, this heightens risks for Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Egypt, threatening offshore energy exploration and counterterrorism efforts.
3. European Vulnerabilities: Refugee flows, combined with clandestine Jihadist networks, increase Europe’s security risks. Turkey has previously leveraged migration for political and financial concessions; the rise of HTS amplifies these pressures, creating opportunities for infiltration, radicalisation, and instability.

Authoritarian Islamist regimes rarely remain contained within their borders.

Conclusion: The Illusion of Transition

Al-Sharaa’s rule is not a transitional experiment toward democracy; it represents the full institutionalisation of radical Islam in Syria. In his speeches, including the recent UN address, he avoids mentioning ‘democracy’, consolidating authoritarian control and enforcing sectarian repression.

History offers cautionary lessons. Post-revolutionary Iran produced regional destabilisation, ideological export, and prolonged conflict. Allowing Syria’s Islamist regime to consolidate unchecked risks repeating these cycles on an even larger scale.

What Should Be Done?

Policymakers and international actors must act decisively:

• Promote decentralised governance and local autonomy to protect vulnerable communities and prevent the consolidation of a centralised dictatorship.
• Condition recognition and engagement on concrete reforms and adherence to human rights.
• Support mechanisms to document and prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by current and former regimes, reinforcing international legal norms.

Failure to act risks entrenching a new authoritarian Islamist regime in the Middle East, threatening regional stability, Mediterranean security, and global counterterrorism efforts.

 

About the author

Azad Deewanee is a London-based scholar with expertise in Middle East conflicts, terrorism, and US foreign policy. His research examines the security and human rights consequences of conflicts, as well as the discourses of conflict parties. Connect with him on LinkdedIn: (https://www.linkedin.com/in/azad-deewanee-phd-a39bb9172/)