**Notes for Lecture on Nationalism and Racism (2020)**

**Introduction**

In this lecture we will focus on the relationship between nationalism and racism. The lecture will be structured around two main questions, in relation to a host of core readings on the subject. These questions are:

1. Critically assess the proposition that the affinity between nationalism and racism has been much exaggerated; and
2. How are the categories of race and nation related to one another?

The core readings which we will review in order to bring these questions into focus include the famous chapter “On National Culture,” from Frantz Fanon’s classic 1961 book, *The Wretched of the Earth*; the chapter on “Patriotism and Racism” in Benedict Anderson’s highly influential *Imagined Communities*, first published in 1983; and Homi Bhabha’s dense but insightful 1991 article, “Race, Time, and the Revision of Modernity.” We will also seek to further complexify the relation between the categories of race and nation by incorporating a gender analytic into our discussion, through the inclusion of the concluding chapter of Anne McClintock 1995 book, *Imperial Leather. Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*, titled, “No Longer in a Future Heaven. Nationalism, Gender, and Race;” as well as Patricia Hill Collins’ path-breaking 2001 article, “Like One of the Family: Race, Ethnicity, and the Paradox of the American Family.”

**On National Culture**

Let us begin with an analysis of how Frantz Fanon conceptualises the distinction between the categories of race and nation in the important chapter “On National Culture,” included in his 1961 classic *The Wretched of the Earth*, completed just months before his untimely death. The chapter was originally presented as a provocative statement made at the Second Congress of Black Artists and Writers, held in Rome in 1959. It is an avowal of revolutionary commitment to the struggle for national liberation.

To this end, the essay begins with an extended quote from Sékou Touré, Guinea’s first president, from an address also delivered at the same Congress, in which Touré excoriated the Black artists and writers present that “they ***must*** fashion the revolution with the people,” indeed, that “[t]here is no place outside that fight for the artist or the intellectual who is not himself concerned with and completely at one with the people in the great battle of Africa and suffering humanity” (p.206). The nation, the African continent, suffering humanity – conceived as concentric circles, convergent scopes, of revolutionary struggle.

Fanon then commences his own locution with the emphatic declaration that “[e]ach generation must out of relative obscurity discover its mission, fulfil it, or betray it” (p.206). This before announcing his intent to “analyze the problem, which is felt to be fundamental, of the legitimacy of the claims of a nation” (p.207). What ensues is an eloquent and elaborate defence of the contours and content of national consciousness – a consciousness which he distinguishes from national***ism*** – in the colonial, and specifically African, context. In the process, he repeatedly juxtaposes national consciousness and racial consciousness, placing his revolutionary and emancipatory hopes in the former (despite his many hesitations and concerns expressed in his chapter “On the Pitfalls of National Consciousness”), while warning that the latter – racial consciousness – is ultimately toxic, bound to lead people down a “blind alley.”

Fanon remarks upon and defends “[t]he passion with which native intellectuals defend the existence of their national culture,” which, he admits, “may be a source of amazement;” yet, he adds, “those who condemn this exaggerated passion are strangely apt to forget that their own psyche and their own selves are conveniently sheltered behind a French or German culture which has given full proof of its existence and which is uncontested” (p.209).

Fanon thus affirms the passionate affirmation of the existence of the national culture where it has been oppressed and denied by the forces of colonialism, and further observes “that this passionate search for a national culture which existed before the colonial era finds its legitimate reason in the anxiety shared by native intellectuals to shrink away from that Western culture in which they all risk being swamped” (p.209). The threat of inauthentic assimilation, countered by passionate self-affirmation, where the self is articulated in explicitly national terms, at least for now.

Fanon was, of course, trained as a psychiatrist. In this vein, he makes an incisive social-psychological observation that the significance of this passionate affirmation of a national culture pre-existing colonialism can be located on the terrain of what he terms “psycho-affective equilibrium.” In his words: “The claim to a national culture in the past does not only rehabilitate that nation and serve as a justification for the hope of a future national culture. In the sphere of **psycho-affective equilibrium** it is responsible for an important change in the native” (p.210).

Conversely, if national self-affirmation proves crucial in the sphere of psycho-affective equilibrium and facilitates the struggle again colonial domination, the denial of national existence is part and parcel of the psychological dimension of the production and reproduction of colonial oppression. As Fanon argues, “colonialism is not simply content to impose its rule upon the present and the future of a dominated country. Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it. This work of devaluing pre-colonial history,” he concludes, “takes on a dialectical significance today” (p.210).

By dialectics, Fanon is referring to the idea of what George Ciccariello Maher has dubbed, “the dynamic movement of conflictive oppositions” (p.2). The moment of national self-affirmation would thus seem to be identified and diagnosed here by Fanon as a dialectical negation of the colonial negation of national existence of an oppressed and subjugated population, or people, on the part of the colonial conquerors.

To this end, Fanon contends that “the total result looked for by colonial domination was indeed to convince the natives that colonialism came to lighten their darkness” (pp.210-211). And given such a situation, such an historical and psychological dimension to the colonial assault, Fanon insists, “the claims of the native intellectual” about the pre-colonial past “are not a luxury but a necessity in any coherent program” (p.211).

So far the terms of dispute would seem clear enough; but at this point, Fanon introduces a crucial addendum to his line of argument. Specifically, he clarifies that the terms of reference in the dispute between the colonizers and the native intellectual about the past are “not specifically national;” indeed, that “[t]he native intellectual who decides to give battle to colonial lies fights on the field of the whole continent;” that, if “[t]he past is given back its value,” the “[c]ulture, extracted from the past to be displayed in all its splendor, is not necessarily that of his own country.” This because the colonial denial to which the native intellectual is responding is continental in scope, and racialized.

As Fanon puts the point: “Colonialism, which has not bothered to put too fine a point on its efforts, has never ceased to maintain that the Negro is a savage; and for the colonist, the Negro was neither an Angolan nor a Nigerian, for he simply spoke of ‘the Negro’. For colonialism, this vast continent was the haunt of savages, a country riddled with superstitions and fanaticism, destined for contempt, weighed down by the curse of God, a country of cannibals—in short, the Negro's country.” In sum, Fanon insists, “[c]olonialism's condemnation is continental in its scope. The contention by colonialism that the darkest night of humanity lay over pre-colonial history concerns the whole of the African continent.”

As a result, Fanon continues, “[t]he efforts of the native to rehabilitate himself and to escape from the claws of colonialism are logically inscribed from the same point of view as that of colonialism. The native intellectual who has gone far beyond the domains of Western culture and who has got it into his head to proclaim the existence of another culture never does so in the name of Angola or of Dahomey. The culture which is affirmed is African culture.”

The transvaluation of the worth of the Negro thus remains trapped in the racialized terms of reference introduced by the colonizers to justify their continent-wide project of pillage and plunder. As Fanon thus contends, “[t]he Negro, never so much a Negro as since he has been dominated by the whites, when he decides to prove that he has a culture and to behave like a cultured person, comes to realize that history points out a well-defined path to him: he must demonstrate that a Negro culture exists (pp.211-212).

Fanon makes it clear who is responsible for “this racialization of thought, or at least for the first movement toward that thought.” The blame lies squarely with “those Europeans who have never ceased to set up white culture to fill the gap left by the absence of other cultures.” In his words: “Colonialism did not dream of wasting its time in denying the existence of one national culture after another.” Action, reaction, in accordance with a dialectical, dynamic movement of conflictive oppositions: “Therefore the reply of the colonized peoples will be straight away continental in its breadth.” This is why, Fanon contends, “[i]n Africa, the native literature of the last twenty years is not a national literature but a Negro literature.” Which brings him to address the movement and concept of negritude, which he frames as “the emotional if not the logical antithesis of that insult which the white man flung at humanity.” In a word, “[t]his rush of negritude against the white man's contempt showed itself in certain spheres to be the one idea capable of lifting interdictions and anathemas” (p.212).

The Negritude movement, as Wikipedia summarizes, was “a framework of critique and literary theory developed mainly by Francophone intellectuals, writers, and politicians of the African diaspora” from the 1930s, “aimed at raising and cultivating ‘Black consciousness’ across Africa and its diaspora. Negritude was founded by [Martinican](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martinique) poet [Aimé Césaire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aim%C3%A9_C%C3%A9saire), [Léopold Sédar Senghor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A9opold_S%C3%A9dar_Senghor) (the first [President](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_(government_title)) of [Senegal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senegal)), and [Léon Damas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A9on_Damas) of [French Guiana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_Guiana).  Negritude intellectuals disavowed [colonialism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonialism), and argued for the importance of a [Pan-African](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan-African) sense of being among people of African descent worldwide. The intellectuals employed [Marxist](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxism) political philosophy, in the Black radical tradition. The writers drew heavily on a surrealist literary style, and some say they were also influenced somewhat by the [Surrealist](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrealist) stylistics, and in their work often explored the experience of [diasporic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_diaspora) being, asserting ones' self and identity, and ideas of home, home-going and belonging.”

Fanon points out that “[t]he poets of negritude [do] not stop at the limits of the continent,” indeed, that “[f]rom America, black voices … take up the hymn with fuller unison” (p.213). To this end, he draws a comparison with the Arab world, where “the struggle for national liberty has been accompanied by a cultural phenomenon known by the name of the awakening of Islam” (p.213), and where, he insists, “[t]he living culture is not national but Arab” (p.214). So here, he draws a distinction between national, pan-Islamic, and pan-Arab consciousness in movement, but the thrust of his argument remains the distinction and intermingling among national and different transnational modes of cultural expression and/or identification. The suggestion is, however, that the categories of Arab, and perhaps even Islam, are somehow analogous to the explicitly racial category of “black” or the implicitly racialized continental referent of African.

It is at this point where Fanon introduces the clear warning that “[t]his historical necessity in which the men of African culture find themselves to racialize their claims and to speak more of African culture than of national culture will tend to lead them up a blind alley” (p.214). He uses the example of blacks from the Americas to explain: “The Negroes who live in the United States and in Central or Latin America in fact experience the need to attach themselves to a cultural matrix.” And yet, he continues, “little by little the American Negroes realized that the essential problems confronting them were not the same as those that confronted the African Negroes.” Indeed, he insists, “[t]he Negroes of Chicago only resemble the Nigerians or the Tanganyikans in so far as they were all defined in relation to the whites.” Even so, he concludes, “once the first comparisons had been made and subjective feelings were assuaged, the American Negroes realized that the objective problems were fundamentally heterogeneous” (pp.215-216).

This leads Fanon to argue that “Negritude … finds its first limitation in the phenomena which take account of the formation of the historical character of men.” For Fanon, this historical character of men is distinctly national, not racial, in cultural content. As he puts it, most memorably: “Negro and African-Negro culture broke up into different entities because the men who wished to incarnate these cultures realized that **every culture is first and foremost national**, and that the problems which kept Richard Wright or Langston Hughes on the alert were fundamentally different from those which might confront Leopold Senghor or Jomo Kenyatta” (p.216).

Having thus emphasised the primacy of national over racial modes of identification in relation to “culture” and “problems” that people face, Fanon returns to analyse in some more depth the trajectory of the native intellectual, to trace the successive steps towards the realization and fulfilment of the imperative to embrace the national liberation struggle. To this end, he emphasizes the process by which the native intellectual who had long aspired to assimilate the colonial culture comes to reject that culture. Fanon insists that “[t]his tearing away, painful and difficult though it may be, is however necessary.” Again his stress is on the psychological dimension. He contends, in a most felicitous rhetorical flurry: “If it is not accomplished there will be serious psycho-affective injuries and the result will be individuals without an anchor, without a horizon, colorless, stateless, rootless—a race of angels” (p.218).

Fanon then continues by considering the desperate attempts that these native intellectuals undertake to hold onto their dearly-achieved colonial cultural inheritance. And it is here where he locates the urge on the part of the native intellectual to embrace an allegedly “universal” perspective. In this vein, Fanon writes: “The intellectual who is Arab and French, or Nigerian and English, when he comes up against the need to take on two nationalities, chooses, if he wants to remain true to himself, the negation of one of these determinations. But most often,” he continues, “since they cannot or will not make a choice, such intellectuals gather together all the historical determining factors which have conditioned them and take up a fundamentally ‘universal standpoint’.” Fanon further interprets: “This is because the native intellectual has thrown himself greedily upon Western culture.” And so, he concludes, “[l]ike adopted children who only stop investigating the new family framework at the moment when a minimum nucleus of security crystallizes in their psyche, the native intellectual will try to make European culture his own” (p.218).

Yet, with the development of the national struggle, the attitude of the native intellectual begins to evolve. As Fanon explains, “at the moment when the nationalist parties are mobilizing the people in the name of national independence, the native intellectual sometimes spurns these acquisitions which he suddenly feels make him a stranger in his own land.” Though he adds, “[i]t is always easier to proclaim rejection than actually to reject” (p.219).

Fanon proceeds to trace the trajectory of evolution of the native intellectual’s posture, across three phases. According to Fanon, “in the first phase, the native intellectual gives proof that he has assimilated the culture of the occupying power;” then, “[i]n the second phase we find the native is disturbed; he decides to remember what he is.” Correspondingly, he contends, the intellectual tries to immerse himself in the nation; however, he continues, “since the native is not a part of his people, since he only has exterior relations with his people, he is content to recall their life only,” in ossified form. “Finally, in the third phase,” Fanon insists, “which is called the fighting phase, the native, after having tried to lose himself in the people and with the people, will on the contrary shake the people … he turns himself into an awakener of the people” (pp.222-223).

This evolutionary process culminates with the full-fledged embrace of the national struggle. In Fanon’s words: “The native intellectual nevertheless sooner or later will realize that you do not show proof of your nation from its culture but that you substantiate its existence in the fight which the people wage against the forces of occupation” (p.223).

For Fanon, the national culture is dynamic, always in motion, ultimately forged, above all else, in the process of struggle for liberation. It is, in the end, the opposite of ossified custom or tradition. In this vein, Fanon writes, “[w]hen a people undertakes an armed struggle or even a political struggle against a relentless colonialism, the significance of tradition changes” (p.224). If “the truths of a nation are in the first place its realities,” Fanon instructs, the intellectual, the artist, must ultimately reject the “mummified fragments which because they are static are in fact symbols of negation and outworn contrivances,” to seek out instead “the seething pot out of which the learning of the future will emerge” (pp.224-225).

In a similar vein, Fanon continues: “It is not enough to try to get back to the people in that past out of which they have already emerged; rather we must join them in that fluctuating movement which they are just giving a shape to, and which, as soon as it has started, will be the signal for everything to be called in question.” He here uses a most suggestive phrase to refer to this dynamic conception of culture – he calls it a “zone of occult instability.” In his words: “Let there be no mistake about it; it is to this **zone of occult instability** where the people dwell that we must come; and it is there that our souls are crystallized and that our perceptions and our lives are transfused with light” (p.227).

As such, any recourse to the past must ultimately be oriented towards the future, and must always be organically embedded in the struggle. As Fanon puts it: “The colonized man who writes for his people ought to use the past with the intention of opening the future, as an invitation to action and a basis for hope. But to ensure that hope and to give it form, he must take part in action and throw himself body and soul into the national struggle” (p.232).

For Fanon, the fight for national culture simply cannot be separated from the fight for the liberation of the nation. In a word, since such liberation provides the “material keystone which makes the building of a culture possible,” there can be “no other fight for culture which can develop apart from the popular struggle” (p.233).

This dynamic conception of national culture, forged in struggle, Fanon distinguishes from “folklore” and from “abstract populism.” According to Fanon, a national culture is nothing less than “the whole body of efforts made by a people in the sphere of thought to describe, justify, and praise the action through which that people has created itself and keeps itself in existence.” As a result, Fanon insists, “[a] national culture in underdeveloped countries should therefore take its place at the very heart of the struggle for freedom which these countries are carrying on.”

And from this dynamic, creative, struggle-based conception of national culture, Fanon returns to condemn again the attachment to racialized consciousness. Along such lines, he contends: “[m]en of African cultures who are still fighting in the name of African-Negro culture and who have called many congresses in the name of the unity of that culture should today realize that all their efforts amount to is to make comparisons between coins and sarcophagi” (pp.233-234).

Fanon here demonstrates an unshakeable faith in the destiny of national liberation, and therefore, the end of colonial domination. He chastises those who “believe that it is possible to create a black culture” for having “forg[otten] that negroes are disappearing, just as those people who brought them into being are seeing the breakup of their economic and cultural supremacy.” He adds, in a telling phrase that links the ultimate of the national culture to a statist conception of political power: “There will never be such a thing as black culture because there is not a single politician who feels he has a vocation to bring black republics into being.” He thus throws lot in with the revolutionary leaders who would found new republics. “The problem,” he insists, “is to get to know the place that these men mean to give their people, the kind of social relations that they decide to set up, and the conception that they have of the future of humanity.” He concludes, “[i]t is this that counts; everything else is mystification, signifying nothing” (pp.234-235).

Fanon doesn’t entirely dismiss the usefulness of the Negritude movement, so long as its advocates prove themselves capable of committing themselves to supporting the peoples’ struggles. He insists: “It is around the peoples' struggles that African-Negro culture takes on substance, and not around songs, poems, or folklore” (p.235). Likewise, he contends: “No one can truly wish for the spread of African culture if he does not give practical support to the creation of the conditions necessary to the existence of that culture; in other words, to the liberation of the whole continent” (p.235), republic by republic.

If Fanon embraces a dynamic, creative, struggle-based, forward-oriented conception of national culture, this is in part because he considers the devastation wrought by colonial domination to be so intense, near-total. Indeed, according to Fanon, “[a]fter a century of colonial domination we find a culture which is rigid in the extreme, or rather what we find are the dregs of culture, its mineral strata.” In his words, “[t]he withering away of the reality of the nation and the death pangs of the national culture are linked to each other in mutual dependence” (p.238).

But again, ultimately action gives way to reaction, and we witness the unfolding of a dialectical, dynamic movement of oppositions. In such a vein, Fanon insists, “in a colonized country the most elementary, most savage, and the most undifferentiated nationalism is the most fervent and efficient means of defending national culture. For culture is first the expression of a nation, the expression of its preferences, of its taboos and of its patterns.” He continues: “[i]t is at every stage of the whole of society that other taboos, values, and patterns are formed. A national culture is the sum total of all these appraisals; it is the result of internal and external tensions exerted over society as a whole and also at every level of that society.” He therefore concludes, again in a deliberately statist vein: “[i]n the colonial situation, culture, which is doubly deprived of the support of the nation and of the state, falls away and dies.” As such, he contends, “[t]he condition for its existence is therefore national liberation and the renaissance of the state” (p.244).

The fight for freedom “opens the door to creation;” indeed, Fanon emphasizes that there can be observed, “on the eve of the decisive conflict for national freedom, the renewing of forms of expression and the rebirth of the imagination” (p.245).

Fanon further exhibits faith that from the struggle will emerge a new man, indeed, a new humanism, in addition to a new national culture. He writes: “After the conflict there is not only the disappearance of colonialism but also the disappearance of the colonized man. This new humanity cannot do otherwise than define a new humanism both for itself and for others. It is prefigured in the objectives and methods of the conflict.” He continues: “A struggle which mobilizes all classes of the people and which expresses their aims and their impatience, which is not afraid to count almost exclusively on the people's support, will of necessity triumph.” He concludes: “The value of this type of conflict is that it supplies the maximum of conditions necessary for the development and aims of culture” (p.246).

Fanon concludes his essay by addressing what he considers “the mistake” of those who call for a new humanism without embracing national consciousness. In this vein, he insists: “[w]e … consider that the mistake, which may have very serious consequences, lies in wishing to skip the national period. If culture is the expression of national consciousness, I will not hesitate to affirm that in the case with which we are dealing it is the national consciousness which is the most elaborate form of culture. The consciousness of self,” he contends, “is not the closing of a door to communication. Philosophic thought teaches us, on the contrary, that it is its guarantee.”

Here he distinguishes between national consciousness and nationalism. He writes: “National consciousness, which is not nationalism, is the only thing that will give us an international dimension.” And he again returns to the scope of the contintent, to make a more positive connection between national consciousness and African consciousness. In his words: “[t]his problem of national consciousness and of national culture takes on in Africa a special dimension. The birth of national consciousness in Africa has a strictly contemporaneous connection with the African consciousness.” As such, he contends, “[t]he responsibility of the African as regards national culture is also a responsibility with regard to African Negro culture.” But he refounds the latter form of consciousness on explicitly political grounds, linking it to the necessity of and commitment to continent-wide struggle. He writes: “This joint responsibility is not the fact of a metaphysical principle but the awareness of a simple rule which wills that every independent nation in an Africa where colonialism is still entrenched is an encircled nation, a nation which is fragile and in permanent danger” (p.247).

In the very last paragraph of the essay, Fanon emphasizes that, in the colonial and specifically the African context, the urgent task of the intellectual is “to build up his nation.” Fanon here demonstrates faith that so doing will of necessity be “accompanied by the discovery and encouragement of universalizing values.” To this end, he insists: “[f]ar from keeping aloof from other nations, therefore, it is national liberation which leads the nation to play its part on the stage of history.” Indeed, “[i]t is at the heart of national consciousness,” he concludes, “that international consciousness lives and grows. And this two-fold emerging is ultimately only the source of all culture” (pp.247-248).

**Imagined Communities of Nation vs. Race**

In the essay “On National Culture,” Fanon thus distinguishes between national and racial consciousness on the grounds of the authenticity of national culture, and in relation to a dynamic, creative, forward-oriented, and struggle-based conception of the nation, compared with an inauthentic, colonially-imposed, backward-oriented, stereotyped, and ultimately folkloric conception of race. For Fanon, the transvaluation of negritude remains ultimately trapped in terms of racialized consciousness that is bound to lead up a “blind alley.” He therefore advocates the embrace of the revolutionary struggle for national liberation against colonial domination instead of organization and cultural activism along racialized lines, even if he also recognises the potential pitfalls of national consciousness as well.

Some two decades later, Benedict Anderson would likewise distinguish between national and racial consciousness, in his chapter on “Patriotism and Racism,” towards the end of his magisterial and highly influential book, *Imagined Communities*, first published in 1983.

In the book, Anderson theorizes the nation form as a uniquely modern type of imagined community, one imagined as limited and sovereign. He emphasizes the role of a new dominant conception of temporality, homogenous empty time, in creating the conditions of possibility for the emergence of national consciousness. He further stresses the processes of print capitalism through which the new conception of temporality as synchronicity would be mediated and diffused. Finally, he contends that once the nation form had emerged by the end of the eighteenth century, it became “'modular,' capable of being transplanted” and adapted across a “wide variety of political and ideological constellations.”

Like Fanon, Anderson is concerned to establish the legitimacy of national consciousness, even of nationalism. To do this, he draws a stark contrast between the logic and dynamics of nationalism and those of racism. Anderson contends that “[i]n an age when it is so common for progressive, cosmopolitan intellectuals (particularly in Europe?) to insist on the near-pathological character of nationalism, its roots in fear and hatred of the Other, and its affinities with racism, it is useful to remind ourselves that nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love” (p.141).

Indeed, he claims, “[s]omething of the nature of this political love can be deciphered from the ways in which languages describe its object: either in the vocabulary of kinship (motherland, Vaterland, patria) or that of home (heimat or tanah air [earth and water, the phrase for the Indonesians' native archipelago]). Both idioms,” he notes, “denote something to which one is naturally tied” (p.143).

The nation, for Anderson, is thus characterised by the emotion of love, not hate, and is based on a community imagined in terms of kinship or home. Which in turn generates a willingness to sacrifice. As Anderson notes, “the great wars … are extraordinary not so much in the unprecedented scale on which they permitted people to kill, as in the colossal numbers persuaded to lay down their lives” (p.144). Moreover, he continues: “[t]he idea of the ultimate sacrifice comes only with an idea of purity, through fatality. Dying for one's country, which usually one does not choose, assumes a moral grandeur which dying for the Labour Party, the American Medical Association, or perhaps even Amnesty International cannot rival, for these are all bodies one can join or leave at easy will” (p.144).

Most often, Anderson adds, the nation is imagined as a community of language. He notes, in this regard, “the primordialness of languages, even those known to be modern.” He remarks: “[n]o one can give the date for the birth of any language. Each looms up imperceptibly out of a horizonless past.” He continues: “(Insofar as homo sapiens is homo dicens, it can seem difficult to imagine an origin of language newer than the species itself.)” As such, he insists: “[l]anguages thus appear rooted beyond almost anything else in contemporary societies. At the same time, nothing connects us affectively to the dead more than language.” To this end, he contends: “[i]f English-speakers hear the words 'Earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust' — created almost four-and-a-half centuries ago - they get a ghostly intimation of simultaneity across homogeneous, empty time. The weight of the words derives only in part from their solemn meaning; it comes also from an as-it-were ancestral 'Englishness'” (pp.144-145).

Anderson proceeds to argue that “there is a special kind of contemporaneous community which language alone suggests - above all in the form of poetry and songs.” He insists: “[s]inging the Marseillaise, Waltzing Matilda, and Indonesia Raya provide occasions for unisonality, for the echoed physical realization of the imagined community” (p.145). He, furthermore, emphasizes: “Yet such choruses are joinable in time. If I am a Lett, my daughter may be an Australian. The son of an Italian immigrant to New York will find ancestors in the Pilgrim Fathers. If nationalness has about it an aura of fatality,” he contends, “it is nonetheless a fatality embedded in history. Here San Martin's edict baptizing Quechua-speaking Indians as 'Peruvians' — a movement that has affinities with religious conversion - is exemplary. For it shows,” he insists, “that from the start the nation was conceived in language, not in blood, and that one could be 'invited into' the imagined community. Thus today,” he concludes, “even the most insular nations accept the principle of naturalization (wonderful word!), no matter how difficult in practice they may make it” (p.145).

As such, Anderson underscores, “[s]een as both a historical fatality and as a community imagined through language, the nation presents itself as simultaneously open and closed” (p.146). Which brings him to the contrast with race and racism. Anderson chastises Tom Nairn, claiming that “Nairn is basically mistaken in arguing that racism and anti-semitism derive from nationalism — and thus that 'seen in sufficient historical depth, fascism tells us more about nationalism than any other episode'” (p.148). He insists instead: “[t]he fact of the matter is that nationalism thinks in terms of **historical destinies**, while racism dreams of **eternal contaminations**, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations: outside history.” He adds: “Negroes are, thanks to the invisible tar-brush, forever negroes; Jews, the seed of Abraham, forever Jews, no matter what passports they carry or what languages they speak and read. (Thus for the Nazi, the Jewish German was always an impostor)” (p.149).

Anderson further contends that “[t]he dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to 'blue' or 'white' blood and 'breeding' among aristocracies” (p.149). To this end, he notes that, “on the whole, racism and anti-semitism manifest themselves, not across national boundaries, but within them. In other words, they justify not so much foreign wars as domestic repression and domination” (pp.149-150).

He goes on to stress this link between racism and archaic, aristocratic ideology, by arguing: “[w]here racism developed outside Europe in the nineteenth century, it was always associated with European domination, for two converging reasons. First and most important,” he contends, “was the rise of official nationalism and colonial 'Russification'.” Second, he continues: “the colonial empire, with its rapidly expanding bureaucratic apparatus and its 'Russifying' policies, permitted sizeable numbers of bourgeois and petty bourgeois to play aristocrat off centre court: i.e. anywhere in the empire except at home” (p.150). As such, he depicts: “In each colony one found this grimly amusing tableau vivant: the bourgeois gentilhomme speaking poetry against a backcloth of spacious mansions and gardens filled with mimosa and bougainvillea, and a large supporting cast of houseboys, grooms, gardeners, cooks, amahs, maids, washer women, and, above all, horses” (pp.150-151).

By contrast, Anderson contends, “it is remarkable how little that dubious entity known as 'reverse racism' manifested itself in the anticolonial movements” (p.153). The dreams of the nation are thus, for Anderson, quite distinct in character from those of race. He concludes: “Through that language, encountered at mother's knee and parted with only at the grave, pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, and futures dreamed” (p.154).

**Race, Time, and the Revision of Modernity**

Homi Babha, for his part, in his dense but insightful 1991 article, “Race, Time, and the Revision of Modernity,” takes Anderson to task for his account of the distinction between the categories of nation and race.

Bhabha begins his article by invoking Fanon’s earlier, 1952 book, *Black Skins, White Masks*, particularly the chapter, “The Fact of Blackness,” in which Fanon “talks not simply of the historicity of the Black man” as much as about “the temporality of modernity within which the figure of the 'human' comes to be” (p.193). According to Bhabha, “Fanon's discourse of the 'human' emerges from that temporal 'break' or caesura effected in the continuist, progressivist myth of Man.”

Bhabha emphasizes the idea of what he refers to as a “time-lag of cultural difference,” which he conceives “as a structure for the representation of subaltern and post-colonial agency” (p.194). Indeed, he motions to an opening up of an “interruptive time-lag in the 'progressive' myth of modernity,” which “enables the diasporic and the post-colonial to be represented” (p.198).

In such a vein, Bhabha refers to Fanon’s critique of Sartre, contending that Fanon “refuses the Hegelian-Marxist dialectical schema whereby the Black man is part of a transcendental sublation: a minor term in a dialectic that will emerge into a more equitable universality. Fanon,” he believes, “suggests another **time**, another **space**” (p.195).

Bhabha speaks of the “contradictory and unresolved” nature of “the project of modernity,” into which this “time-lag” is inserted, “in which colonial and postcolonial moments emerge as sign and history” (p.195). For Bhabha, “[t]he discourse of race … displays the problem of the ambivalent temporality of modernity …” (p.196).

Bhabha champions subaltern and postslavery narratives for engendering “critical-theoretical perspectives” that effectively interrupt and displace the Western Discourses of modernity. He cites the example of “Houston Baker's reading of the modernity of the Harlem Renaissance,” which “strategically elaborates a Reformation of mastery, a vernacularism, based on the enunciation of the subject as 'never a simple coming into being, but a release from being possessed’” (p.199).

Such narratives, Bhabha claims, prove capable of “introduce[ing] another locus of inscription and intervention, another hybrid, 'inappropriate’ enunciative site, through [a] temporal split – or time-lag” (pp.199-200). In other words, he suggests, “the temporal caesura, which is also the historically transformative moment,” occurs “when a lagged space opens up in-between the intersubjective ‘reality of signs ... deprived of subjectivity' and the historical development of the subject in the order of social symbols” (p.200).

Pretty dense, to say the least. But what is relatively clear is that Bhabha is seeking to centre “colonial and slave histories,” which he suggests can affect a “split consciousness,” can introduce a “colonial disjunction” into “modern times,” because, he contends, in such histories “the reinvention of the self and the remaking of the social are strictly out of joint.” (p.202). This leads him to ask: “what is this ‘now’ of modernity? Who defines this present from which we speak?” Which in turn leads to an even “more challenging question: What is the desire of this repeated demand to modernize? Why does it insist, so compulsively, on its contemporaneous reality, its spatial dimension, its spectatorial distance” (p.202).

Bhabha goes on to diagnose “a tension between the ***pedagogy*** of symbols of progress, historicism, modernization, homogenous empty time, the narcissism of organic culture, the onanistic [or fruitless] search for the origins of race, and what I shall call the 'sign of the present’, the **performativity** of discursive practice, the *récits* of the everyday, the repetition of the empirical, the ethics of self-enactment, the iterative signs that mark the non-synchronic passages of time in the archives of the new” (p.204).

For Bhabha, there is something in modernity which is more than modernity, and that something is “the signifying cut or the temporal break” (p.204). With “the emergence of modernity - as an ideology of beginning, modernity as the new – the template of [the] 'non-place' becomes the colonial space” (p.205). But the colonial space, in turn, co-mingles with, indeed, pervades the so-called First World. To this end, Bhabha cites Gyan Prakash, who insists: “The Third World, far from being confined to its assigned space, has penetrated the inner sanctum of the 'First World' in the process of being 'Third Worlded' - arousing, inciting, and affiliating with the subordinated others in the First World ... to connect with minority voices” (p.206).

From here, Bhabha proceeds to pose another question: “What is the ‘we’ that defines the prerogative of my present?” (p.207). His answer would center those at “the margins of the First and Third Worlds …” (p.207).

By centering those at the margins, we can effectively introduce the time-lag, which is for Bhabha “indeed the very structure of difference and splitting within the discourse of modernity,” and which thereby “turn[s] it into a performative process,” in which “each repetition of the sign of modernity is different, specific to its historical and cultural conditions of enunciation” (p.207).

Bhabha then turns to level a critique against the eminent social theorist Michel Foucault’s account of race and racism in the introduction to the *History of Sexuality*, according to which “racism emerges in the nineteenth century in the form of an historical **retroversion** that Foucault finally disavows” (p.207). Bhabha chastises Foucault, remarking: “What is profoundly revealing is Foucault's complicity with the logic of the 'contemporaneous' within Western modernity. Characterizing the 'symbolics of blood’ as being retroverse, Foucault disavows the time-lag of race as the sign of cultural difference and its mode of repetition” (p.208).

Bhabha also notes that “[e]lsewhere Foucault directly links the 'flamboyant rationality' of Social Darwinism to Nazi ideology, ignoring colonial societies which were the proving grounds for Social Darwinist administrative discourses all through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” (p.208).

Which brings him to Anderson. Bhabha contends: “If Foucault normalizes time-lagged, retroverse sign of race, Benedict Anderson places the 'modern’ dreams of racism ‘outside of history’ altogether. For Foucault race and blood interfere with sexuality. For Anderson,” Bhabha insists, “racism has its origins in antique ideologies of class that belong to the aristocratic 'pre-history’ of the modern nation. Race represents an archaic ahistorical moment outside the modernity of the imagined community: 'nationalism thinks in historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations’ … outside history” (p.208).

Bhabha continues: “for Anderson the 'modern' anomaly of racism finds its historical modularity, and its phantasmatic scenario, in the colonial space which is a belated and hybrid attempt to 'weld together dynastic legitimacy and national community … to shore up domestic aristocratic bastions’. The racism of colonial empires is then part of an archaic acting out, a dream-text of a form of historical retroversion that ‘appeared to confirm on a global, modern stage antique conceptions of power and privilege'.” Bhabha therefore reproaches Anderson: “What could have been a way of understanding the limits of Western imperialist ideas of progress within the 'colonial metropolis' - a hybridizing of the Western nation – is quickly disavowed in the language of the opera bouffe as a tableau vivant of 'the [colonial] bourgeois gentilhomme speaking poetry against a backcloth of spacious mansions and gardens filled with mimosa and bougainvillea'.” But for Bhabha, “[i]t is in the ‘weld’ of the colonial site as, contradictorily, both ‘dynastic and national’, that the modernity of Western national society is confronted by its colonial double. Such a moment of temporal disjunction, which would be crucial for understanding the colonial history of contemporary metropolitan racism in the West, is placed 'outside history’. It is obscured by Anderson's espousal of a simultaneity across homogenous empty time' as the modal narrative of the imagined community. It is this kind of evasion,” Bhabha concludes, “that makes Partha Chatterjee, the Indian 'subaltern' scholar, suggest, from a different perspective, that Anderson 'seals up his theme with a sociological determinism ... without noticing the twists and turns, the suppressed possibilities, the contradictions still unresolved’” (pp.208-209).

Bhabha insists: “by relegating the social fantasy of racism to an archaic daydream, Anderson further universalizes his homogeneous empty time of the 'modern' social imaginary” (p.209). Even so, Bhabha continues: “Hidden in the disavowing narrative of historical retroversion and its archaism, is a notion of the time-lag that displaces Foucault's spatial analytic of modernity and Anderson's homogeneous temporality of the modern nation. In order to extract the one from the other we have to see how they form a double, catachrestic boundary: rather like the more general intervention and seizure of the history of modernity that has been attempted by post-colonial critics” (p.209).

Bhabha accuses: “At the level of content the archaism and phantasy of racism is represented as 'ahistorical', outside the progressive myth of modernity. This is an attempt,” Bhabha argues, “to universalize the spatial fantasy of modern cultural communities as living their history 'contemporaneously', in a homogenous empty time of the People-as-One that deprives minorities of that marginal, liminal space from which they can intervene in the unifying and totalizing myths of the national culture” (pp.209-210).

Bhabha admits: “Anderson goes further in acknowledging that colonial racism introduces an awkward weld, a strange historical ‘suture', in the narrative of the nation's modernity. The archaism of colonial racism, as a form of cultural signification (rather than simply an ideological content), reactivates nothing less than the ‘primal scene' of the modern Western nation: that is, the problematic historical transition between dynastic, lineage societies and horizontal, homogenous 'secular' communities.” Nevertheless, Bhabha contends: “What Anderson designates as racism's 'timelessness', its location 'outside history', is in fact that form of time-lag, a mode of repetition and reinscription, that performs the ambivalent historical temporality of modern national cultures - the aporetic coexistence , within the cultural history of the modern imagined community, of both the dynastic, hierarchical, prefigurative 'medieval' traditions (the past), and the secular, homogeneous, synchronous cross-time of modernity (the present).” It is, for Bhabha, unfortunate that “Anderson resists a reading of the modern nation that suggests - in an iterative time-lag - that the hybridity of the colonial space may provide a pertinent problematic within which to write the history of the 'postmodern' national formations of the West” (p.210).

From here, Bhabha reaches the strong conclusions of his approach: “To take this perspective would mean that we see 'racism' not simply as a hangover from archaic conceptions of the aristocracy, but as part of the historical traditions of 'civic' and liberal humanism that create ideological matrices of 'national' aspiration, together with their concepts of 'a people' and its imagined community. Such a privileging of ambivalence in the social imaginaries of nationness and its forms of collective affiliation, would enable us to understand the coeval, often incommensurable , tension between the influence of traditional identifications that coexist with ‘contemporary’ secular, modernizing aspirations. The enunciative ‘present’ of modernity that” Bhabha proposes “would provide a political space to articulate and negotiate such culturally hybrid social identities. Questions of cultural difference would not be dismissed – with a barely concealed racism – as atavistic ‘tribal' instincts that afflict Irish Catholics in Belfast or 'Muslim fundamentalists' in Bradford. It is precisely such unresolved, transitional moments within the disjunctive 'present' of modernity that are then projected into a time of historical retroversion or an inassimilable place 'outside history’” (pp.210-211).

In sum, for Bhabha, “[w]hat Foucault and Anderson disavow as 'retroversion' emerges as a retroactivity, a form of cultural reinscription that moves back to the future.” Bhabha instead calls it “a 'projective' past, a form of the future anterior.” He believes that “[w]ithout the postcolonial time-lag the discourse of modernity cannot … be written; with the projective past it can only be written as a narrative of alterity that explores forms of social antagonism and contradiction that are not yet properly represented, political identities in the process of being formed, cultural enunciations in the act of hybridity, in the process of translating and transvaluing cultural differences” (pp.212-213).

Bhabha insists: “you might think that it lacks time or history, don’t be fooled” (p.215). His is an “attempt to constitute a postcolonial, critical discourse that contests modernity through the establishment of other temporal sites, other forms of enunciation” (p.215). A critical discourse that centers “the figure of the witness of a postcolonial modernity” in possession of “another wisdom,” coming from “those who have seen the nightmare of racism and oppression in the banal daylight of the everyday” (p.216). A critical discourse that refuses to dismiss racism as archaic or outside of time, but locates in the very heart of the modern, amidst “the ideological matrices of national aspirations.”

**No Longer in a Future Heaven: Nationalism, Gender, and Race**

In the concluding chapter, “No Longer in a Future Heaven: Nationalism, Gender, and Race,” from her 1995 book *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*, Anne McClintock takes Benedict Anderson to task for ignoring the way in which the nation is always gendered. She begins the chapter by recalling Anderson’s warning against Gellner’s dictum that nationalism invents nations, “that Gellner tends to associate invention with falsity rather than with imagining and creation.” She rehearses Anderson’s view that “nations, in his all too famous phrase, [are] ‘imagined communities’ - in the sense that they are systems of cultural representation whereby people come to imagine a shared experience of identification with an extended community.” From this, she proceeds to emphasise that, “[a]s such, nations are not simply phantasmagoria of the mind but are historical practices through which social difference is both invented and performed.” But then, crucially, she adds: “Nationalism becomes, as a result, radically constitutive of people's identities through social contests that are frequently violent and **always gendered**. Yet,” she concludes, “if the invented nature of nationalism has found wide theoretical currency, explorations of the gendering of the national imaginary have been conspicuously paltry” (p.353).

McClintock emphasizes that “[a]ll nations depend on powerful constructions of gender.” In her words: “Despite many nationalists' ideological investment in the idea of popular unity, nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned institutionalization of gender difference” (p.353). And yet, she argues, “with the notable exception of Frantz Fanon, male theorists have seldom felt moved to explore how nationalism is implicated in gender power” (p.353).

McClintock quotes the path-breaking work of Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias, who “identify five major ways in which women have been implicated in nationalism: (1) as biological reproducers of the members of national collectivities; (2) as reproducers of the boundaries of national groups (through restrictions on sexual or marital relations); (3) as active transmitters and producers of the national culture; (4) as symbolic signifiers of national difference; and (5) as active participants in national struggles” (p.355).

She goes on to sketch the contours of what she thinks the elaboration of a feminist theory of nationalism would entail. According to McClintock, such a theory should be “strategically fourfold: (1) investigating the gendered formation of sanctioned male theories; (2) bringing into historical visibility women’s active cultural and political participation in national formations; (3) bringing nationalist institutions into critical relation with other social structures and institutions; and (4) at the same time paying scrupulous attention to the structures of racial, ethnic and class power that continue to bedevil privileged forms of feminism” (p.357).

In the rest of the chapter, she tries to live up to this fourfold scholarly agenda, by paying extended attention to the writings of Frantz Fanon in particular, before engaging in a critical feminist analysis of the racialized, classed, and gendered trajectories of the nationalisms of the Afrikaner community and of the African National Congress in the South African context.

Let us here, however, focus on the attention she pays to Benedict Anderson in the course of her account. In a preliminary section on “The Gendering of Nation Time,” McClintock quotes Bhabha, who, following Anderson, writes: “Nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realize their horizons in the mind's eye.” She goes on to emphasize that “Bhabha and Anderson borrow here from Walter Benjamin’s crucial insight into the temporal paradox of modernity.” She adds: “For Benjamin, a central feature of nineteenth-century industrial capitalism was the "use of archaic images to identify what was historically new about the nature of commodities. In Benjamin's insight, the mapping of Progress depends on systematically inventing images of archaic time to identify what is historically new about enlightened, national progress. Anderson can thus ask: “Supposing ‘antiquity’ were, at a certain historical juncture, the necessary consequence of novelty?” (p.358).

From this point, she goes on to argue: “What is less often noticed, however, is that the temporal anomaly within nationalism – veering between nostalgia for the past and the impatient, progressive sloughing off of the past – is typically resolved by figuring the contradiction in the representation of time as a natural division of gender.” She therefore contends: “Women are represented as the atavistic and authentic body of national tradition (inert, backward-looking and natural), embodying nationalism 's conservative principle of continuity. Men, by contrast represent the progressive agent of national modernity (forward-thrusting, potent and historic), embodying nationalism's progressive, or revolutionary principle of discontinuity. Nationalism's anomalous relation to time is thus managed as a natural relation to gender” (pp.358-359).

McClintock concludes: “National time is thus not only secularized, it is also domesticated. Social evolutionism and anthropology,” she insists, “gave to national politics a concept of natural time as familial. In the image of the Family Tree, evolutionary progress was represented as a series of anatomically distinct family types organized into a linear procession, from the ‘childhood’ of ‘primitive’ races to the enlightened ‘adulthood’ of European imperial nationalism” (p.359).

**Like One of the Family: Race, Ethnicity, and the Paradox of the American Family**

In McClintock’s account, she emphasizes that “[t]he family trope is important for nationalism in at least two ways. First, it offers a ‘natural’ figure for sanctioning national hierarchy within a putative organic unity of interests . Second, it offers a ‘natural’ trope for figuring national time” (p.357). Likewise, she contends that “[t]he metaphoric depiction of social hierarchy as natural and familial – the national family, the global family of nations, the colony as a family of black children ruled over by a white father – depended … on the prior naturalizing of the social subordination of women and children within the domestic sphere” (p.358).

Patricia Hill Collins builds on these insights in her path-breaking 2001 article, “Like One of the Family: Race, Ethnicity, and the Paradox of the American Family.” The article explores how “gendered family rhetoric contributes to understandings of race and US national identity” (p.3). Hill Collins illuminates: “(1) how intersecting social hierarchies of race and ethnicity foster racialized understandings of US national identity; (2) how the gendered rhetoric of the American family ideal naturalizes and normalizes social hierarchies; and (3) how gendered family rhetoric fosters racialized constructions of US national identity as a large national family” (p.3).

Hill Collins makes use of the French Marxist philosopher Etienne Balibar’s distinction between “external and internal racisms as two interrelated phenomena that appear across diverse societies” (p.6). For Balibar, and for Hill Collins, external racisms are “expressed through practices such as xenophobia, genocide, or so-called ethnic cleansing,” and they “aim to remove undesirable races from what is seen as privileged home space. In contrast, internal racisms occur when powerful racial groups subordinate less powerful racial groups within one society, typically because they need such groups to maintain their standard of living” (p.6). Internal racisms, for their part, are “[e]xpressed via practices such as colonialism, apartheid and racial segregation,” and they seek to “include and control less powerful racial groups within what is seen as privileged home space” (pp.6-7).

According to Hill Collins, “neither form typically appears by itself and, because they remain deeply intertwined, external and internal racisms often reinforce one another within the boundaries of pre-existing nation-states” (p.7).

Hill Collins goes on to pose the question: “What happens when these dual racisms become integral to the founding moments of a nation-state?” She answers: “National identity itself can become so compromised by such deeply embedded racial processes that it becomes difficult to conceive of national identity in terms other than racial” (p.7). Such is the case of the United States.

Hill Collins traces a “core racial triangle among white settlers, indigenous peoples, and enslaved Africans,” which “became foundational to the new US nation-state” (p.7). According to Hill Collins: the relationship among “the first-class white citizen, the foreign Indian who stands outside citizenship, and the second-class black citizen … became fixed as essential ingredients for a fundamentally racialized American national identity” (p.8). She adds that “[a]ccomplishing this racialized national identity required reducing the myriad of ethnicities that characterized European, American Indian and African populations into three core racial categories” (p.8).

Hill Collins goes on to argue that “[t]he relationships among these three racial groups were not only integral to the inception of US national identity and its codification in the founding of the nation state, but the racial triangle has repeatedly been reworked in response to the exigencies of subsequent historical periods” (p.8). She contends that “[f]or existing and immigrant ethnic groups alike, the process of being or becoming ‘American’ required jockeying for a position in relation to the racial reference points of white, native and black” (p.9). Though she notes that “the Latino population constitutes varying mixtures of all three ‘racial’ categories and, thus, from its inception has constituted an important challenge to the racial triangle described here” (p.9).

From here, Hill Collins proceeds to introduce an analysis of how family rhetoric “works to naturalize and normalize social practices that distribute wealth and poverty among US families” (p.13). To this end, she insists: “social hierarchies of social class and gender rely on the rhetoric and practices associated with the American family ideal. At the same time,” she continues, “these hierarchies do not invoke family in the same way. On the one hand, class hierarchies rely heavily on exclusionary practices that seem designed to keep families separated from one another. Exclusionary practices appeal to notions of group purity. Reminiscent of external racisms, the goal is to remove the offending social group, in this case, poor and working-class families, from competition for college admissions, desirable neighbourhoods, and professional jobs seen as the property of more afuent middle- and upper-income American families. In contrast, gender hierarchies rely more heavily on practices designed to subordinate members who are permanently included within individual family units” (p.14).

According to Hill Collins, gender hierarchies are “[r]eminiscent of the practices associated with internal racisms,” insofar as they “work with the theme of a proximate difference where it becomes important to maintain power differentials among individuals included in the same system” (p.14).

She insists: “Hierarchy … becomes normalized because it is associated with seemingly natural family processes of family households, neighbourhoods, schools, churches, recreational facilities and the local shopping mall” (p.15). In a word “the rhetoric and practices associated with the American family ideal naturalize and normalize racial hierarchy” (p.15) as well.

Hill Collins explains: “[i]n addition to the rhetoric provided by the American family ideal, practices concerning actual American families also work to naturalize and normalize racial hierarchy. The multiple meanings attached to the concept of home – home as family household and home as neighbourhood – also speak to the significance of family in regulating the property relations that are so central to racial hierarchy” (p.16). She continues: “[t]he history of race- and class-segregated housing that, in turn, constitutes the core identity of race- and class-segregated neighbourhoods forms one important pillar of racial hierarchy in the United States” (p.16). She contends: “Just as crafting a family from individuals from diverse racial, ethnic, religious or class backgrounds is frowned upon, mixing different races within one neighbourhood is discouraged” (p.17).

Hill Collins goes on to add that “[t]he gendered nature of the American family ideal means that the production of racial hierarchy through racially segregated geographic and social space is also deeply gendered” (p.17). The logic of racial segregation is imagined in terms of “defending the family,” in effect, protecting “private, feminine entities … from intruders” (p.18).

In sum, Hill Collins concludes: “If the US nation-state is conceptualized as a large American national family understood through the rhetoric of the American family ideal, then this ideal may provide a template for assessing group placement within and contributions to US national well-being.” She insists: “Within this logic, Native Americans, African Americans, Puerto Ricans and Chicanos become the ‘domestic others’ – they become included within the body politic like one of the American family. In contrast,” she contends, “racial/ethnic immigrants from Mexico, Central America, Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa become the ‘foreign blacks’ and ‘Latino immigrants’ who become targets of exclusionary policies” (p.18).

**Conclusion**

Let us, therefore, conclude. In this lecture, we have explored the relationship between nationalism and racism. We began with an overview of how Frantz Fanon distinguishes between national and racial consciousness in his essay “On National Culture” included in his 1961 book, *The Wretched of the Earth*. We then turned to examine Benedict Anderson’s attempt to distinguish nationalism from racism in the chapter on “Patriotism and Racism” in his influential *imagined Communities*. This before considering Homi Bhabha’s dense but insightful criticism of Anderson’s attempt to distinguish these two forms of politics and consciousness. We concluded with an attempt to further complexify the relationship between nationalism and racism, by incorporating a gender-analytic into our account, through treatment of relevant chapters and articles by Anne McClintock and Patricia Hill Collins.